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The article attempts to analyze the public debate in a present day Poland fo-
cused on the country’s recent history and memory (or memories). The author 
believes that among other lines dividing Polish society, the cultural line se-
parating opposing “communities of memory” is of special importance. The 
political and public life of the country is fa cing a paradox: the media and se-
veral political leaders view the past as the last potential platform for a natio-
nal unity and a source of commonly shared values and ideas. They treat the 
past as the support for gaining publicity and political capital. But this past 
orientation causes further division and confl ict since, instead of a single past, 
participants in the public discourse view several competing pasts. The author 
proposes two ideal types of historical narratives in Poland: national and civic. 
Turning points, the pantheon of heroes, and modes of narration are sometimes 
mirror images of one another. Since recently the “national” paradigm is preva-
lent the author believes that the new European identity (or plurality of collective 
identities) of Poland can be successfully built only on a civic, not a national, 
platform of historical narrative. 
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On the 2nd of February 2007, the evening news on the fi rst channel of Polish public tele-
vision presented very peculiar information. The Polish tabloid Fact had discovered a 
short fi lm made by future offi cers from the military school in Wroclaw. The fi lm shows 
a man in the uniform on his knees and another one pretending to shoot him in the back 
of the head with a handgun. The “shot” person falls on the snow. In the commentary 
following the fi lm, the speaker calls it a scandal. Why? Because (the journalist com-
ments) shooting in the back of the head was a favorite method of the nation’s enemies. 
The next scene shows a fragment of the fi lm about an Armia Krajowa offi cer shot in 
the back of the head by a Secret Police agent. Than, historical black and white scenes 
from Katyń, where The Soviets killed almost 20 thousand Polish offi cers using the 
same method. Finally there is a daughter of the Katyń offi cer, who comments on the 
behavior of the offi cers from the Wrocław school as immoral and who asks rhetorically 
if they have a conscience. 
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I conducted a small experiment in which I showed the clip to my students and asked 
them to comment on it. More or less half of them agreed that the whole clip is a misuse 
of the media, while the second half of the group did not see any signs of such misuse. 
Does this mean that at least a part of the (young) public have got used to such media 
messages? For the author of the clip, the behavior of the offi cers is the scandal not 
because someone is playing with a gun, but because he does it in the same way our 
enemies treated our nation in the past. Why does the author of this short clip put the 
historical and national frames of interpretation (in Erving’s Goffman’s (1986) sense) 
onto something that can be viewed (using another frame of interpretation) as just a 
stupid behavior of young future offi cers?
In my opinion the example given above is a symptom of one of the most important 
cultural trends in Polish public discourse. It shows how the public life of Polish so-
ciety is deeply rooted in the past. In recent years, the public and media discourse have 
become more and more past-oriented. A large part of Polish mediascape (Appadurai 
1996: 27–47) is built on historical decorations. We have really come a long way from 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s idea of the “thick line” cutting away from the communist roots 
and the communist past is out of fashion. Being up to date today means to carefully 
look into the past. The message from the side of politicians is clear: the past matters. 
There are plenty of other examples of the “historicization” of the evening news. 
Secret police agents, fi les, tapes, or old photographs are presented as “hot” topics. Half-
century-old stories like uncovering facts from the Post-War Stalinist terror or the de-
nouncing of a public fi gure as a secret police informer, is quite often the information 
that opens the evening news. 
Poland has never had such a great chance to become a knowledge-based society. But 
this will be the knowledge-based society of a special type – a society based on histori-
cal knowledge. The nation has even institutionalized its memory by creating IPN – The 
Institute of the National Remembrance – a large and powerful institution which plays 
an important role in Polish political life. It is used as a tool by politicians, not only to 
explore the recent past but most of all to judge present-day political enemies. For the 
opponents of the IPN it is obvious that such judgments are designed for the contempo-
rary, political purposes. 
Source: Wiadomości TVP 1, 2 February 2007 
The scandal in Wrocław. The historicisation 
of the mediascape
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To understand the situation of the country today, we should return to history (how 
else?) for a while. The Republic of Polish Peoples was a time of two layers of memo-
ry. The offi cial, dominant memory was a large narrative celebrated in state-organized 
events, presented in museums, and taught at schools. The learning of “proper” history 
was an important factor of ideological socialization. Each larger city had a Museum 
of the Revolutionary Movement, which, after 1989 was turned into a historical or lo-
cal museum – or was simply closed. Teaching about medieval societies was viewed 
through the scope of the class struggle theory. As Barbara Szacka has noted (Szacka 
2000b: 24), the battle of Tannenberg was anachronically presented as the victory of 
Poles against their eternal enemies – the Germans. The “offi cial” layer of memory was 
full of paradoxes, blank pages, anachronisms and examples of “invented traditions”, 
but in some sense it was coherent and stable. The other layer of memory existed under 
the surface of the political and cultural life of the society. It was unoffi cial memory, not 
one but several narratives where such words as Piłsudski, the Wisła Miracle or Katyń 
had their own deep meanings. Interest in local or oral history was, from the point of 
view of the regime, very suspicious activity because sooner or later the enquiry would 
lead to the “forbidden” past. That is why the counter-memory, in a Foucaultian sense 
(Foucault 1977), was carried along by oral histories, jokes, and gossi p. 
The transformation of 1989 caused the pluralization of memories. Minority groups 
with their suppressed memories were fi nally able to express their visions of the past. 
They gained the support of NGO’s and other institutions of a democratic, civil society. 
The transformation was a time of revival of interest in local history, minority history, 
traditions, and “local pride”. The pluralization made memory and history alive again, 
but this also resulted in the emergence of confl icting memories on different societal 
levels – from the local to the international. 
One of the most broadly discussed memory confl icts was the case of Jedwabne. It 
started locally but soon became the subject of “hot” international debate. Jedwabne 
is a small town in Northeastern Poland, today quite sleepy, and now culturally homo-
genous (the citizens are almost 100% Polish Roman Catholics). Before the war, half of 
the population were Jews – Jedwabne then was a typical shtetl (Yiddish – town), where 
Jews owned most of the shops, workshops, inns, and small manufactures. The Second 
World War brought an end to this and a thousand other small Jewish communities.
In May 2000 a Polish sociologist living in New York, Jan Tomasz Gross, published 
a book “Sąsiedzi” (Neighbors). While analyzing documents as well as oral – and writ-
ten – testimonies, he reconstructed the tragedy of the Jedwabne Jews. In July of 1941, 
after Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the Jews of Jedwabne were murdered by their 
Polish neighbors. They were gathered, brutally beaten, and burned in a stable outside 
the city. A few days later there was a hunt for those who had escaped burning. 
Actually Gross was not the fi rst to uncover the Jedwabne crime. Shortly after the 
war there was a legal trial. A few of the leaders of the pogrom were sentenced. But 
for decades the crime was known only to a small group of scientists from the Jewish 
Historical Institute in Warsaw and a few historians, and was a “public secret” or a part 
of the “collective unconsciousness” of the Jedwabne community.
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The publishing of the book started a debate in Poland on Polish guilt, amnesia, 
Polish attitudes towards the holocaust, and Polish involvement in Jewish extermina-
tion. For many, the book was a shock. They started asking, how could such horrors be 
caused by Polish people? Why was public opinion, for decades, not informed about 
this? Could it be truth? The Jedwabne case was decidedly a threat to the Polish positive 
self-image. One of the ways of dealing with it was to change it, to admit that the nation’s 
past consisted not only of glorious moments. Another way was denial and hiding in a 
fortress of traditional heroic or martyrological self-imagery. The Jedwabne case played 
an important role in the public discourse and was the turning point of the debate on the 
national curriculum. 
Nowadays we are witnessing another cultural turn in Poland. It corresponds to the 
switch of the political pendulum to the right (and populist) side, but it goes far beyond 
the political situation. It is a change in culture and mentality – not only in politics. This 
change is being strengthened by other “soft” cultural trends, usually associated with 
post-modernity: museum-mania, interest in genealogy, the collecting of vintage ob-
jects, “conspicuous traditions” (as Thorstein Veblen would probably call it), and other 
forms of commercial and non-commercial uses of history. But of course the political 
context is the central core of this change. To illustrate this switch, which more or less 
happened suddenly in Poland, let me quote Paweł Pacewicz from Gazeta Wyborcza. He 
has made a short frequency analysis of the opening presidential speeches of two Polish 
presidents. The results are presented in this Table 1.
Table 1. Opening Presidential Speeches –frequency of selected expressions 
Expression Aleksander Kwaśniewski Lech Kaczyński 
Modernity, Future, XXI Century 9 1
Tradition 1 4
Nation, Independence 7 11
Source: Piotr Pacewicz, „Kwaśniewski i Kaczyński o Polsce i Polakach”, Gazeta Wyborcza, 12/2005. 
Many independent thinkers in Poland warn that the country is going through a 
strong wave of the rebirth of national rhetoric, deeply rooted in Polish romantic, post-
romantic, and “endecja” (National Democracy) traditions. In this historical context, it 
is natural that the past has a greater meaning than it did just a few years ago. 
 Why do we countenance this return of history? Is it a natural stage that a post-
communist society has to go through after half a century of the “frozen” discourse on 
memory? Or is it a part of the broader, global process – the wave of memory that haunts 
today’s world as Pierre Nora and many other thinkers believe?
This return to the past might be viewed as the answer to the serious political, cul-
tural, and social crisis. Polish political life is facing the problem of legitimization. The 
society, as it had during communist times, still views its political leaders as “them”. 
Possible ways of integrating society onto a platform of civic values has failed. Politicians 
have turned to history as the last possible common platform of social unity. The populist 
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rhetoric presents the national past as a source of values that can unite the whole nation 
(such rhetoric was especially visible in the media soon after the death of John Paul II). 
It seems that Polish society faces the following paradox. The political elites perceive 
the past as a source of commonly shared values and a platform for potential national 
integration. Other potential sources of national mobilisation are (in their perception) 
exhausted. But this past-orientation is causing new divisions and deepening already 
existing memory confl icts. In post-communist society the past and memory is never 
neutral; they are what strengthens, not weakens, the memory confl icts. 
Those confl icts have split the society which has become an entity composed of op-
posing “communities of memory” (Szacka 2000a: 53). The main division lines in Polish 
society correspond with the different attitudes to the past1. The winners and losers of 
the economic transformation, the majority and minorities, the nation and society – they 
have all developed their own image of history from pieces of the past. 
The policy of the “thick line” versus the prosecutor’s attitude 
After the 1989 breakthrough, the majority of the intellectual elites agreed that in the 
name of national reconciliation the communist past should be isolated from the present 
with a thick line. This meant that building a strong, independent state on the one side 
and a strong civil society on the other should be not based on divisions from the past. 
This paradigm has failed. The political elite of the so-called 4th Republic view it dif-
ferently, as if they had internalized Orwell’s slogan from 1984 “whoever controls the 
past, controls the future”. The re-modeling of recent history is one of the priorities of 
their policy. Historians play a special role in this project, quite often mixing their com-
petences with the duties of prosecutors. This might be called the prosecutor’s attitude. 
In their opinion, the past should not only be carefully studied, but most of all it should 
be judged (glorifi ed or criminalized).
The dominant national discourse versus counter-memories 
To illustrate this division line I will use the following example: after the end of the 
Second World War in Poland, part of the resistance movement did not stop fi ghting, 
treating the newly created communist regime as a continuation of the country’s occu-
pation. In the Podlaskie province there were numerous hiding in the forest anti-com-
munist partisan groups who continued fi ghting and committing acts of sabotage. One 
of them was the group under the command of Romuald Rais “Bury”. His squad was 
a part of the anti-communist resistance army, the National Army Union, created after 
the dissolution of the Armia Krajowa. The squad was active on the territories of the 
new Poland – the USSR borderland, populated by Polish, Belarusian, and Ukrainian 
people. The second two national groups were accused of pro-communist and pro-soviet 
1 The idea of memory division lines splitting society was borrowed from chapter titles of Nora, P. (ed.). 1996. 
Realms of Memory. The Construction of the French Past: Confl icts and Divisions, vol. 1, New York: Colum-
bia University Press.
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sympathies and were often attacked and persecuted by the resistance movement (espe-
cially the leaders of those communities, the biggest enthusiasts of the new regime). In 
the winter of 1946, Romuald Rais group killed 28 Belarusian men, not involved in any 
political activity, only used as wagoners (to carry goods), then shot in the back of the 
head. After the self-dissolution of the squad in 1946, “Bury” hid, and, expecting the 
further consequences, did not emerge when the amnesty in 1947 was proclaimed. In 
1948 he was arrested, sentenced to death, and executed.
After 1989, many members of the anti-communist resistance movement, with death, 
or years-long sentences, were vindicated, as victims of the communist terror legal sys-
tem. One of them was Bury – for some people, still a heroic partisan. But his crime was 
remembered by members of the Belarusian minority, who protested against his abso-
lution from guilt. They wanted to commemorate “the crime on the wagoners” (as the 
massacre was called) by erecting a monument with the inscription naming the killers 
and the organization they belonged to. This started a very hard discussion involving the 
representatives of national groups and many institutions, including a presidential com-
mission. The Belorussian minority fought for the right to commemorate the truth of the 
crime. A few representatives of the majority perceived it as an attack on the resistance 
ethos and its heroes. Finally the monument was erected. It stands at the same cemetery, 
very close to the old communist monument commemorating the Security Police offi -
cers who fought with the resistance movement shortly after the war, and near a recent 
monument devoted to the soldiers of the resistance. But the physical proximity of these 
monuments does not mean that the plurality of the “paths of remembering” has been 
accepted. It rather symbolizes the divisions and confl icts of memory. 
Minorities quite often represent a sort of inverted (in comparison with the majority) 
vision of recent history. The heroes become felons (as was the case with Romuald Rais 
“Bury”), the occupation becomes liberation, and the act of commemoration becomes 
a scandal. 
The strengthening of the main, national, state-supported vision of the past may re-
sult in the fact that many cultural groups will be alienated from it, because their visions 
of the past may not fi t into the larger ideological project. In many aspects this would be 
a return of the situation from before 1989, when cultural minorities had no opportunity 
to express their right to remember and to commemorate their history.
Memory confl icts are natural in a democratic society. In cases when they are sup-
pressed or denied by the state, the groups (the carriers of memory) may be margina-
lized, but their counter-memories may be strengthened. 
Communist nostalgia versus the criminalization 
of the Republic of Polish People 
Each past produces certain nostalgia – even one that at a fi rst glance seems to be not at-
tractive at all. Such is the memory of the Republic of Polish People. Research suggests 
(Kwiatkowski 2005: 7–91) that there are large segments of Polish society living with 
an idealized image of communist times; from the stable work situation, social security, 
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and cheap credit to the better quality of TV series and popular songs. All this produces 
a nice, sweet, and nostalgic image of the “good old times”. In peoples’ consciousness it 
is strongly contrasted with the time after the 1989 transformation – a period of dynamic 
change and uncertainty. 
The second attitude, shared by a majority of the present day ruling class and those 
who voted for them means that the biographies of those representatives of the political, 
economical and cultural elite who lived in the PPR should be carefully studied and 
judged – and in the end eliminated from public life in case any act of collaboration with 
the “criminal state” could be proved. 
 I presume that as long as the second paradigm (the criminalization of the Republic 
of Polish people) dominates public discourse, the nostalgic groups will suffer from 
large cognitive dissonance. “That is not the PPR I remember” – they might say. 
This division line may serve as a model situation: it clearly shows how social memo-
ry works. In contrast with history, it is not sensitive to slight differences, to shadows, to 
a plurality of positive and negative aspects of the same fact. It views the certain period, 
process or person in black or white colors. The Polish communist past, being more and 
more distant becomes viewed in a simplifi ed way: as a happy arcadia or an empire of 
absolute evil.
National versus civic models of historical narratives
Summing up, the division lines noted above have caused the dramatic split of the two 
competing models of historical socialization and historical narratives which have exis-
ted since the 1989 transformation. This is the nation which in many ways continues the 
tradition of the PPR on the one hand, and messianism and martyrdom on the other. The 
second paradigm might be named a civil narrative. They both have their own turning 
points and their own pantheon of heroes. It means that sometimes one interpretation of 
a historical fact is the reverse image of the other. Such is the case with the Round Table 
of 1989. Was it a triumph of democracy or an unforgivable compromise with the reds? 
The answer to this question for either model would be extremely different. 
There are very visible attempts to take control over the past by the state institutions 
(including administration, schools and, most of all, Institute of National Remembrance). 
The perfect example might be Roman Giertych, the minister of education who, during 
his commemorative speech on the 1st of September, said that “history has to be care-
fully built”. In some sense, those attempts might be a return of the situation from before 
1989. Minority histories and the civic, pluralistic memory might be suppressed in the 
form of symbolic violence by the national, state-controlled history. The following table 
compares both models and their possible consequences for society. 
What is the possible cure for this situation? In the ideological project of the so-called 
4th Republic there is a disproportion between two fl ows of memory, which Barbara 
Misztal calls bottom-up and top-down memories (Misztal 2003: 61). Top-down memo-
ry, spread by the state institutions and the media, tends to dominate the popular image 
of the past. It seems that there is an urgent need to deeply rethink the national curricu-
lum, to ensure that the story of the society – civil society – not the Polish nation – is 
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being told. This implies stressing on the civil resistance over the historical monopoly of 
the state. This resistance might be achieved through education and the activities on the 
grassroots level of local communities. 
Table 2. The two competing pasts 
National paradigm Civil paradigm 
Rhetoric of resistance. The main goal of his-
torical socialization is to defend “our” version 
of history. State support to the initiatives of 
commemoration of Polish martyrdom is the 
answer to the activities of other states (“They, 
Germans, have their centre of Expulsions; We, 
Poles, will count the material losses of Poland 
during the 2nd World War”)
The historical narrative is the story of Polish 
martyrdom or victories. 
Rhetoric of emancipation. Historical socializa-
tion is an important part of civic awareness and 
the core of identity building. 
The narrative is focused on the democratic 
traditions of Poland and the history of culture 
(longue durre instead of political curriculum). 
State monopoly and control over the images of 
the past. The version of history presented by 
minority cultural groups is marginalized and 
suppressed. 
Plurality of historical narratives. Even margi-
nalized social individuals and collective actors 
have right to express their vision of the past. 
Memory confl icts are viewed as a threat to the 
offi cial version of history (as a disfunction) or a 
threat to the nation’s self image.
Memory confl icts are a natural part of public 
debate.
History gives support to current political 
needs. The Institute of National Remembrance 
is an important tool in the ideological war. 
(As in the case media’s so called “fi le game”). 
The agendas of historical socialization are an 
autonomous but not dominant element of pub-
lic life. 
The Polish history narrative is contrasted with 
the European memory and the memories of 
other nations. 
The Polish history narrative is complemen-
tary to the European memory (or plurality 
memories). 
Memory is legitimized by the authority of the 
state.
Memory does not need legitimization. 
Historians act as prosecutors. They view their 
role not only as an act of exploring the past 
but – most of all – judging it. 
Historians act as scientists.
The main subject, the carrier of collective 
memory, is the nation. The strong state is 
viewed as a support to the nation building on 
the platform of national history. 
The society is viewed as a plurality of the com-
munities of memory (from the individual to the 
societal level). Pluralism of memories implies 
constant meta-refl ection on the mechanisms of 
social remembering and forgetting.
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Conclusions
Local history, the narratives of minorities, oral histories, and personal stories might be 
diffi cult to fi t into the ideological project of a united national history. That is why they 
should be supported and developed as a sort of counter-balance. They might also raise 
the level of self-refl ection in the realm of social memory. A self-refl ective society and 
self-refl ective cultural groups are better prepared to resist the “historically obsessed” 
decision makers supported by the media. Can a crisis of memory be overpowered by 
the institutions of civil society? It has to; otherwise we will become another bitter les-
son for Polish history. 
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KURTI PRAEITĮ, PAMIRŠTI ATEITĮ: 
AR LENKIJOS VISUOMENĖ GRINDŽIAMA
ISTORINIU PAŽINIMU?
Radoslaw Poczykowski
Straipsnyje apmąstoma nūdienėje Lenkijoje vykstanti viešoji šalies istorijos ir 
atminties (atminčių) diskusija. Autoriaus manymu, šiandienėje lenkiškoje kultū-
roje atsiranda itin svarbus „atminties bendruomenių“ fenomenas. Šalies politi-
niame ir viešajame gyvenime iškilo tam tikras paradoksas: paskiri žiniasklaidos 
ir politikos atstovai praeitį supranta kaip vienintelį galimą tautinės vienybės ir 
tautinių vertybių pamatą ir šaltinį. Senosios tradicijos čia traktuojamos kaip ga-
limybė siekti viešumo ir politinio kapitalo. Ši pozicija iš esmės prieštarauja kitai, 
kuri viešajame diskurse praeitį traktuoja kaip daugybę tarpusavyje besivaržančių 
praeičių. Straipsnio autorius skiria du idealius istorinių naratyvų šiuolaikinėje 
Lenkijoje tipus – tautinį ir pilietinį. Herojų panteonas ir tam tikri naracijos būdai 
neretai gali būti suprantami kaip vieni kitų veidrodiniai atspindžiai. Dabartinė 
„tautinė“ paradigma yra itin plačiai paplitusi, todėl, autoriaus manymu, naujojo 
Lenkijos europietiškojo tapatumo (ar kolektyvių tapatybių daugumos) pamatu 
gali tapti ne tautinis, o pilietinis istorinis naratyvas. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: pilietinis švietimas, kolektyvinė atmintis, istorinė politi-
ka, socialinė atmintis, tautą formuojantis viešasis diskursas. 
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